I can't quite make out if this is new or not. The attack vector here seems congruent with a similar exploit from a couple months ago [1]

But still might be an open threat. On the email thread Jens seems to think that this is already patched and in stable, he also points out that for this exploit to work (as written in the article) you already need escalated privileges [2] Catchy title though.

[1] https://snailsploit.com/security-research/general/io-uring-z...

[2] https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2/448

> “and is writable with CAP_SYS_ADMIN”

Am I reading this wrong or is this just a way of executing an arbitrary binary with uid=0 if you have both CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_SYS_ADMIN?

If you can write modprobe_path, is it really news that you can find a way to execute code?

What is happening? I see multiple outages and CVEs is being reported on HN's front page. I've never seen these many security/incident related posts on HN's front page.

It is wild how many vulnerabilities are still popping up in io_uring. The attack surface is just so large.

This kind of post really shouldn't require client-side js — from third-party domain — to read...

static markdown version: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ze3tar/ze3tar.github.io/9d...

Desktop and server vulnerabilities are one thing. At least many are actively maintained and will get patched. I have a concern about all the common and cheap internet firewalls and routers that are around, running old software and kernels. Many or most will not get patched. I have some Ubiquiti boxes that are long out of support and run old kernels for instance. The hope is only that there's nothing they expose that gets hit.

CAP_NET/SYS_ADMIN is required for this. So this would be "not as bad" as the others.

Let's see... That's 4 Linux LPEs in the last 10 days?

Copy Fail [1]

Copy Fail 2: Electric Boogaloo [2]

Dirty Frag [3]

And now this...

[1]: https://copy.fail

[2]: https://github.com/0xdeadbeefnetwork/Copy_Fail2-Electric_Boo...

[3]: https://github.com/V4bel/dirtyfrag

io-uring is a security nightmare. Constant privescs and a powerful primitive for syscall smuggling. Worth considering disabling it outright (already the case for most containers afaik).

Interesting, I haven't tested this myself but intuitively I think that a 4 byte OOB write is plenty for a data-only attack like [PageJack](https://i.blackhat.com/BH-US-24/Presentations/US24-Qian-Page...), so I don't think hardening against the KASLR leaks discussed in OP would necessarily save you from this attack.

How many systems have the relevant NICs, and followed the non-automatic setup steps in https://docs.kernel.org/networking/iou-zcrx.html, and are not running within a VM/container disabling io_uring?

This seems on the low impact end of the numerous historical io_uring issues.

Interesting and important all the same.

[flagged]

I first read this from the author's posting to oss-security. Turns out that the author did agree to revise the blog post for the "admin cap for root shell" part [^0]. [^1] would probably tell more.

The title looks like clickbait to me.

[^0]: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/08/10

[^1]: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/08/14

Do most servers need this? Or can most of us 'sysctl -w kernel.io_uring_disabled=2 ' ?

> Affected: Linux 6.15 – 6.19 [...] Fix: commit 770594e (not yet in any stable branch at time of writing).

Is it considered good pactice to publish a vulnerability not yet patched in any stable branch?

So this is another CVE? Or am I misreading this one? "Copy‑fail", "DirtyFrag", now "IUrinegOnYou :)"?

Joke aside, we'll see more CVEs in the coming months, and in a sense that's good: it leaves less maneuvering room for bad actors (especially those selling them to the highest bidder).

If this many are public right now, what does that say about the dark matter of private ones? What's the typical public-private rate for this sort of thing/can someone help me calibrate my base rate expectations?

What’s our prior for p(doom) today…?

high privilege access required (CAP/NET admin), containers / sandboxing wins once again.

Can we make sandboxing the new default now? Flatpak does a good job, but we're still pretty far away for apt/yum/pacman installed packages. AppArmor was a decent step forward, but clearly not enough.

[dead]

Another one.

Linux is falling apart faster than it can assign these CVEs.