For those unfamiliar with the context: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%27No_Way_to_Prevent_This,%27_...

What are the actual guarantees that go/Rust make that Python/npm don’t? It seems like it might just be that Python/npm are juicier targets? I’m starting to try and avoid all third party packages

I know people have opinions about cooldowns, but they would have saved you from axios, tanstack, and many other recent npm supply chain attacks. If you have Artifactory / Nexus, you probably already have cooldowns, but it's easy to set up if you don't.

Why cooldowns? Most npm (or pypi) compromises were taken down within hours, cooldowns simply mean - ignore any package with release date younger than N days (1 day can work, 3 days is ok, 7 days is a bit of an overkill but works too)

How to set them up?

- use latest pnpm, they added 1 day cooldown by default https://pnpm.io/supply-chain-security

- or if you want a one click fix, use https://depsguard.com (cli that adds cooldowns + other recommended settings to npm, pnpm, yarn, bun, uv, dependabot and renovabot)

- or use https://cooldowns.dev which is more focused on, well, cooldowns, with also a script to help set it up locally

All are open source / free.

If you know how to edit your ~/.npmrc etc, you don't really need any of them, but if you have a loved one who just needs a one click fix, these can likely save them from the next attack.

Caveat - if you need to patch a new critical CVE, you need to bypass the cooldown, but each of them have a way to do so. In the past few weeks, while I don't have hard numbers, it seems more risk has come from Software Supply Chain attacks (malicious versions pushed) than from new zero day CVEs (even in the age of Mythos driven vulnerability discovery)

I’m using nix for managing npm dependencies in a project and it seems like I accidentally got some protection from these attacks because of the nix sandbox. Looks like I got more than I begged for.

There has been a lot of pain at my various jobs installing a safe global npm config on every developer machine, asking people not to disable it, checking it with mdm tools. A safer out-of-the-box configuration is long overdue.

There is no legitimate reason why postinstall scripts need to exist. The npm team needs to grow up and declare "starting with npm version whatever, npm will only run postinstall scripts for versions of packages published before ${today}".

I think people are overlooking the fact that the javascript ecosystem is run by perpetual beginners who are probably using 5 different SAAS credential managers and still manage to check their creds into a public git repo. No wonder there are so many breaches. Rust developers otoh are typically experts and don't get pwned so easily.

I use C++ and Conan with my own recipes and pre-built artifacts.

This mitigates things to a great extent.

I do not know who thought that having your dependencies depend on the internet with a zillion users doing stuff to each package was a good idea for enterprise environments...

It is crazy how much things can get endangered this way.

Thoughts and Prayers to those affected

Kudos to the author : this article read like something out of The Onion.

It's a cultural issue, always feeling the urge to update to the newest possible package for things that are already working fine, without even reading the changelog to see if it's applicable. Cooldowns are only a way to force a bit of patience onto the maintainers... and they work.

With the recent high-profile attacks on PyPI packages, it’s no longer true that npm is the “only package manager where this regularly happens”.

In fact, pip is much more dangerous than npm because it lacks a lockfile. uv fixes that, but adoption is proceeding at a snail’s pace.

Do not fucking use npm. Stay the fuck away from it. Want to write JS? AI can now write vanilla JS for you with no libraries. Own your code.

No surprise here. That's what you get when you have a language/ecosystem where core devs refuse to fix fundamental flaws, cuz for them breaking backwards compatibility is the worse crime that can ever be committed. And so all that happens in JS-land will eternally be layering lipstick on the pig in the cesspool. Too afraid of going through something similar to the Python 2 -> 3 fiasco, I guess because too many web devs and site admins would be incensed at being forced to fix their broken universe; as if it isn't already broken in its current condition.

I really don't understand why the npm project cannot embrace PGP as an ambulatory 'good enough' solution.

The answer is LLM inspection. Which, sadly, raises the cost of software, especially once evil LLMs start hiding the backdoors better. Long term the answer should be CHERI, in my opinion.

These satire articles on cybersecurity are really entertaining.

The other one a few days ago was also good: https://nesbitt.io/2026/02/03/incident-report-cve-2024-yikes...

...so far...

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Vendorizing using git submodule should be a robust mitigation for this problem.