AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
81 points - yesterday at 4:59 PM
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I have many opinions regarding this situation, but it mostly doesn't matter. AUR staff and AUR helper developers will figure out what they want to do, hopefully they will find a good approach.
But what I personally take away from this is simply that it has become worth it to target desktop Linux with malware. Or at least, moreso than previously. It is perhaps a good sign in some ways that the desktop is starting to be taken more seriously.
The bad news, of course, is that the Linux desktop is a bit of a train wreck in terms of security hygeine. It's getting better, and Linux does have the advantage of having some powerful primitives to exploit, but the desktop suites come from a totally different world, and I fully expect we'll also see more malware propagated through KDE's New Stuff integration (which goes through Pling.)
A bunch of common yay commands also return back the last updated time of a package thanks to https://github.com/Jguer/yay/pull/2846.
This is a good thing, because the warning about checking everything you download from the AUR, which has always existed, is now actually "enforced". People respond to consequences.
I do not think this something you can escape by switching distro.
It is so sad that every goodwill eventually got enshittified as well.
Mitigation Tool: https://github.com/cookiengineer/antimiasma
Blog Post with details: https://cookie.engineer/weblog/articles/malware-insights-mia...
An Arch maintainer that I personally know once admitted that he rarely review upstream changes when bumping package versions. He only does that when the build breaks.
I can't blame him for what he did, since it's not reasonable to ask package maintainers to spend all their time on those stuff, especially in this "Age of AI" where more and more software are being aggressively refactored (or rather rewritten) and added more features.
What we can do is choosing a stable distro (like Debian) where packages are more thoroughly reviewed, and apply security practices (such as TOTP, sandboxing browsers and video players, etc.) even though they cause inconvenience.
Then set it in a loop on all the packages for a particular system, I don't have experience in package maintenance and would be curious what kind of issues would come up.
This confuses me - why would a proof-of-work anti-scraping system like Anubis prevent registrations?