I think this has been posted in response to this news story [1] to clarify that GrapheneOS has strong protection against data being extracted even without a duress PIN/password.

On a related note, a recent article [2] also describes how GrapheneOS helped a journalist protect his work and his confidential sources citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted.

[1] A US man is being prosecuted after allegedly using a GrapheneOS duress PIN to wipe his Pixel during a border search – https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/23/cop-city-pro...

[2] A Journalist had his mobile phone seized. Did using GrapheneOS protect his data? – https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Journalist-Richard-Me...

What GrapheneOS is missing is a complete backup and restore solution so that people can preventively wipe their smartphone before crossing the border. It would be nice to have the possibility to backup/restore every app and their data from an ssh/sftp server the way google/apple users do with google cloud / icloud. I'd rather wipe my smartphone, only add a couple of direct contacts, a copy of my passport and the pdf of my plane tickets, take the plane and cross the border with a smartphone with very little but real personal data they already know and be able to provide my PIN/password to law enforcement if they ask for it, abiding with law if such a law exist (which is the case in my home country), than using a duress and risk prosecution.

Sure that doesn't protect your data from any other attack vector but it allows you to travel with less risk of getting detained by law enforcement of a country you are visiting. You get asked your password, you can give it, and they see a phone that is used like a dumbphone. If you get questioned for that a simple "my phone died yesterday, a friend just gave me his old pixel". If you need more stuff/information during your travel you would basically only need to remember the passphrase to access a password manager or a remote ssh server but you can restore only the stuff you need when travelling and and wipe again at any moment.

Having said that maybe it is better to set this up some way but not have it builtin so that law enforcement doesn't expect that any grapheneos user would have his data on an sftp server somewhere by default. Otherwise we are back to point 0 where they would ask to connect to it and restore to a phone they own. Oh and have a dummy google account you only used to purchase a couple of silly stuff on amazon, aliexpress and shein and random subscription of various "non risky subjects" on youtube. The gmail address would quickly be filled with enough spam to look genuine.

I am travelling abroad in 3 weeks for a month and I am seriously considering wiping up my grapheneOS phone before flying. I am wary that I could be targeted at a border just for having a google pixel with grapheneOS. Or maybe I should just leave my main phone at home and only travel with a new empty 150€ phone with only my main family emergency contacts. I don't remember ever being asked to show my smartphone at a border but you never know when it will happen. Thanksfully until you reboot it there is nothing that shows from the lockscreen that it is not running the regular google pixel android.

There was some comment here somewhere arguing that 16 characters for a password is too little, but that he used the pattern lock. Looks like it was deleted.

Anyway. The pattern lock in Android provides Log2(389112) =~ 18.57 bits of entropy. This is less than 3 random characters, or 4 lowercase letters, or a decimal PIN digit password of 6 characters.

Granted, you could use mnemonics for long passwords, but how convenient is to input those long passwords?

I wonder why don't they just allow for longer passwords and just use a hash digest when it's too long, rather than just disallowing people from using strong passwords that they will remember. This pushes people to reuse passwords, send them to themselves, and other bad practices.

It's really comical when you want to have same security guarantees as you get on apple devices you are a criminal. Search more: "apple devices automatically restart", "apple device full encryption", "apple lockdown mode".

edit: this was a response to another comment opps.

although it is wonderful to know that there exists a piece of hardware in the world that is not conspiring against its users, the outcome of entering a duress password should be indistinguishable to the user that grabs hold of the mobile phone. The duress password should wipe off the real user account information but present the kidnappers with a full-fledged operating system populated with real-looking content to entertain the police officers with polite meaningless e-mails saying things like

> > On Apr 11, 2015, at 5:45 PM, Jim Steyer Hey John, > > > > We know you're a true master of cuisine and we have appreciated that for > years ... > > > > But walnut sauce for the pasta? Mary, plz tell us the straight story, > was the sauce actually very tasty? > > > > > Jim

Does it protect it in After First Unlock mode? I often use my device and if I lock it before LE or another bad actor catches it then it's kind of useless if it doesn't protect my data in after first unlock (locked) mode. Especially with LE agencies having tools like Cellebrite at their station for same day analysis. Most people probably won't have time to reboot their device.

Similar to how I use Veracrypt, but I leave my PC running, because I hate spending time booting up again. So LE could decrypt my stuff using RAM extraction stuff.

Does anyone know if the Motorola partnership is still on with GrapheneOS or how long until a phone is made available from them?

I always leave my phone and laptop off when going through TSA or Passport Control. I don't think in the US you an be compelled into giving up your password. They are free to confiscate the device but with it powered down good luck trying to break the password.

Relevant xkcd https://xkcd.com/538/

Here's an idea: soft duress PIN that wipes a list of apps of your choice however doesn't make it obvious it's done so.

Or restores app data to a restore point of your choosing making it seem like everything is fine.

Make it untraceable you had it setup and it'll help deal with any potential legal issues.

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It's fairly easy to open up a phone and probe inner circuitry.

I suspect that'll be the next step for malicious actors. I doubt very much the phone is fully resistant to having malicious data injected onto various busses.