A few observations to add context (partially stolen from PPRuNe):

- Pilot Flying (PF) was the Captain, 55 yo (presumably) more experienced pilot, who only got certified to fly that type (B767) in May

- Pilot Monitoring (PM) was a 38 yo first officer, also not very experienced on B767

- PF made a number of mistakes, going too high, too fast (partially because he was descending too fast), not catching the glidescope on time

- PM was concerned that the approach/descent was abnormal but kept his mouth shut as the more experienced captain was at the controls (Edit: apparently he did speak up but PF did not acknowledge)

- PM lowered the flaps much later than required (PF orders flaps lowered and PM executes, but flaps can only be lowered when aircraft goes below certain speed) and the flaps were lowered all the way as the plane crossed the runway threshold, which likely caused plane to "float" and overshoot even further

- Plane touched down too late, and left wheel even later, which likely precluded some braking mechanisms from activating (or the PF forgot to since was busy trying to put the thing down)

- PM finally said "too fast, go around" but PF ignored him (or likely did not hear)

- In these situations PM has the right (and obligation) to take over the controls and start go around by themselves, but he didn't, presumably because the Cap was driving

- PF finally panicked and started the go around procedure, bit realized it was too late almost as the front wheel exited the runway, idled the engines and reapplied the brakes.

So, yeah...

The details of course matter; but the overarching principle put on stark display here is that if you don’t meet stabilized approach criteria (on-speed, on-glidepath, minimal necessary flight control deflections) at the 1000 ft AGL gate, go around. Yes grey areas exist but this approach never became stabilized. The whole approach was a missed opportunity to go around.

I am a pilot; and although I don’t fly large transport category aircraft, this sort of procedural discipline makes all the difference no matter what you fly.

>A pilot called for flaps to be set to 20 degrees, and the other pilot cautioned they were too fast. The other pilot made additional comments regarding the aircraft’s excessive speed throughout the remainder of the recording. There was not a consistent verbal response to the comments about speed.

Wow, The Rehearsal season 2 flashbacks. Although the show was mostly pure absurdity, the central claim of crisis in cockpit communications / lack of adequate FAA mandated training around interpersonal dynamics was spot on.

It was an overrun accident of an Amazon cargo plane that killed 5 people: https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/06/us/boeing-miami-plane-overrun...

Pilot here but not ATP or Jet rated.

When you try to land with too much energy the airplane refuses. When you get within a wingspan or two of the ground then ground effect starts giving you more and more lift. That plus excess speed means the airplane simply will not come down.

To force it down you lower the nose but that can end up castering on the nose wheel, starting a PIO event (pilot-induced oscillation), or as in this case the left wing just refused to stop flying. The "quartering tailwind" is a red herring. The jet was well within its tailwind limits - most of the wind was crosswind at that point and the tailwind contribution wasn't anywhere near enough to explain what happened. When you get above glide slope things get worse as you now need to lose altitude but that increases your speed. Even if you get the speed under control if you come at the runway with a 1700-2500fpm descent rate inertia can slam you into the runway.

They were coming in with way too much speed. They leveled off and got above glide slope because they were trying to bleed off enough speed to get within flap speed - flaps give you more drag which they desperately needed.

I made the transition this year into a much higher performance airplane and even going from a Cessna 172 to an A36 TN Bonanza the difference is stark. You must be way further ahead of the airplane in the Bonanza or you will find yourself screaming into the airport at 170kts when your landing speed is more like 80kts. And discover you are above flap and gear extension speed with all power taken out - thus without a good way to slow down.

Transport category jets are that times 100. You absolutely cannot get behind the aircraft. You plan your descents. You begin them much earlier. You pull power earlier. You add drag before speed runs away.

Above all else when you're barreling in 40kts above landing speed you call a go-around and try it again. It is way too late to fix it.

This accident started 30 minutes before they touched the tarmac. A complete failure of planning, of execution, and of ADM (to admit the problem and go-around).

This has all the hallmarks of a "gethomeitis" disaster, where the urge to push on overrides better judgment about going around and doing things properly.

So many mistakes. A notable part is this:

>> CVR: 00:15 A pilot called for a go-around.

>> FDR: 00:15 Brakes were released at a groundspeed of 120 knots and throttles were increased to a value consistent with go-around thrust.

>> FDR: 00:11 The throttles were reduced to idle power and the brakes were re-applied. The groundspeed was 117 knots. The throttles remained at idle, and brakes remained applied until the end of the recording.

So they decided to go-around (i.e. do not land and climb immediately, going full thrust), then 4 seconds later changed their mind and went back to power idle and brakes (unclear how speed didn't increase).

While they were still late in calling a go-around (they should have done it before being anywhere close to touching down due to their unstable approach), guessing those 4 seconds contributed to the disaster by a lot.

Looking at it from the glass-half-full perspective, I'm impressed that pilots declare go-around as often as they do. As someone who sometimes can't decide whether I should declare a production incident (even if it's not my change), I wonder if it's possible to learn that decisiveness.

> There was no indication in the recorded data that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed.

I don't know anything about flying. Is this normal? Doesn't sound like it, but I don't know why the pilots would not have used these things that sound useful.

Captain Steeeve’s latest video on this tragedy is shocking, complete disregard for the aviation rules. I think he cited 11 separate instances of __mandatory__ go around, the first of which was before they were anywhere near the runway at 1000ft elevation.

So sad. Multiple humans may make more serious mistakes as a group than individually could. FAR/AIM is written with blood. There could be an automated safeguard to block such landing attempts - with the capability of explicit emergency override - based on the profile of the approach or even just based on the intercom.

tldw, per Blancolirio: unstable approach, crew should have done a go around at 1000 agl but did not attempt one until it was too late, then aborted the go around.

Not enough info yet. Clearly they landed too fast, but why? Was there some problem on approach which caused a fast landing? NTSB hasn't gotten to that part yet.

From the timeline, one pilot knew they were too fast 90 seconds before touchdown.

> [01:42] A pilot called for flaps to be set to 20 degrees, and the other pilot cautioned they were too fast. The other pilot made additional comments regarding the aircraft’s excessive speed throughout the remainder of the recording. There was not a consistent verbal response to the comments about speed

The interaction here is eerily similar to the pilot interactions preceding the 1997 Korean Air Flight 801 (B747) disaster in Guam [1]. It's not clear based on the NTSB update if the Captain was ignoring the First Officer or the other way around.

[1]: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Flight_801_-_Aircr...

Related:

Prime Air crash: 10+ mandatory go-around triggers were ignored [video] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49650689 - September 2026

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xm6G7EOP5Qc

apparently they weren't even properly configured until almost touching down.

I know that it's not a luxury that all metro areas can implement, but if you look at airports like Denver or Kansas City, there is a very, very good reason that those airports are out in the middle of nowhere. Lots of accidents happen close to the runway, either on takeoff or landing. It's better that it be in a field than a road or building filled with people.

They made a whole song about this

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ccq30minme8

Prediction: this incident will eventually lead to the mandating of AI pilot assistance on large aircraft. AI doesn't defer to old guys.

[dead]

I've been watching the Flying for Money videos on this. He has interesting insight. It's a bit disappointing he just threw the data into an LLM for processing since it doesn't seem that hard to process, but otherwise he's been pretty good at bringing up likely possibilities based on Occam's razor. Mostly around negligence and most recently about junior vs senior pilot shyness vs ego.

What I don't understand from his analysis though was early on he said the tail wind increased a minute before landing which is too quick to have communicated. If that's true, we need to get better about this. A minute to send a message is ages. It should be automatic between the airport and the aircraft.

The NTSB confirmed that while the pilot applied the physical wheel brakes, the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) showed zero evidence that the speed brakes/spoilers ever extended. They also overshot the runway; I think those were the key mistakes that caused the accident.

https://www.wisn.com/article/amazon-cargo-plane-black-box-mi...