Compromised LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI Installs a Credential Stealer and Backdoor
327 points - today at 2:00 PM
SourceComments
Okay, checked, it was March of this year: https://futuresearch.ai/blog/litellm-pypi-supply-chain-attac.... What even is time anymore in the llm age?
At one point permission pop-up fatigue sets in we start giving any permission as if it's normal. We also become desensitised to isntalling tools: brew, npm, it becomes second nature.
"Oh, those 367 tools installed by package X? Yeah yeah, must be normal, that's how all these work now".
"Brew shows 59 packages outdated?". "Must upgrade". "Yeah, done. Perfect".
And the advent of agents and harnesses. It's not a matter of whether, it's when! OSes need to do something about it. Help users have complete separate "program space" at ease with better, easier, and lighter VMs if nothing else. I know, I know - Unix and Linux solved all this even before Alexander III of Macedon started wearing his nappies. Of course.
They revoked all but one developers, which is probably the right approach, but I'd pin LiteLLM to "something before this version" and keep it there until further notice!
All I read was that it creates a directory from the build file but seemingly no description how new files or added dependencies slipped by. Was `cook.pth` a dependency that got automatically downloaded from PyPI on install and then the build system put it into dependencies?
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Leaving this for others:
> BerriAI’s private release pipeline built these wheels from an attacker-modified git source. The attacker could have used a compromised maintainer or bot credential, a private branch or mirror, or the reference the pipeline builds from. A stolen PyPI token used from the attacker’s own machines fits the evidence less well.
Makes sense. It was that a maintainer or the private pipeline was attacked and the malicious dependency was injected there by squatting on the maintainer's local copy rather than the dependency being hijacked for everyone. Very clever.
> OSS Users > For the time being, please pin your version to 1.106.2 or any explicit version published prior to now.
> Enterprise Customers > There currently exists a private LiteLLM registry for enterprise customers, in which we are distributing an embargoed release that remediates a vulnerability whose disclosure date is scheduled for October 27. Our private registry is not affected. If you are an enterprise customer pulling from our private registry you are not affected.
However, if anyone is looking for 20x faster and less "targeted" LiteLLM alternative - I'm work on one in Go. That's why GoModel it's called. https://github.com/ENTERPILOT/GoModel/
1792590232 | Litellm 1.107.0 Compromised | https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/47826 | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50180845 | 0 comments
1. Google Cloud Outage [0]
2. eMudhra CA private key Leak [1]
3. PingCap TiDB 10.6 TB data Leak [2]
4. PHP2Shell uncovers critical CVEs (with AI) [3]
...and now we have Round 2 of a LiteLLM compromise after the first one in [4].
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50163961
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579
[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50173716
https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/47826
oh boy. Announcing that there's a private enterprise repo you should be paying for if you don't want a credential stealer in your build is quite the optic, and then announcing there's an undisclosed second vulnerability that's being distributed, just not to the poors...